I do not normally read memoirs or autobiographies. In fact, I don’t think I have ever read a political memoir. I have always suspected they are rather biased, set the author too positive of a light, and ignore shortcomings and the other side of issues. Thus, I was rather suspect when someone told me (actually ordered me) to read Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, Secretary Robert Gates’ memoir of his time as the Secretary of Defense (from the end of 2006 thru the middle of 2011). After finishing the book, I am glad to report that my suspicions were not confirmed – instead the book was an unfiltered view of how political appointees work together with the President and Congress to direct the massive bureaucracy of the Federal Government and lead the Defense Department.

Gates was a pre-eminent American leader in the national security arena. He previously served in numerous administrations, starting as an Air Force officer in 1967, moving into the intelligence world, working on the National Security Council, and eventually leading the CIA during the last two years of President H. W. Bush’s (Bush 41) administration. Throughout the book, he details how past decisions in other Administrations, often that he helped shape, were affecting current events. Interestingly, he even recounts how everyone on the Bush 41 team expected Saddam Hussein to be overthrown by the Iraqi military after the first Gulf War.

Secretary Gates took over the helm of Defense at a precipitous time, confronting a world with American’s engaged in two wars, a rising Russia, and a threatening Iran. At the same time, he found himself fighting a bureaucratic fight within the Defense Department to focus projects and spending on the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq rather than potential future conflicts. When he first took the job, Gates was “struck” by the “seeming detachment from the wars we were in and [the service chief’s] focus on future contingencies and stress on the force” rather than the “need for us to win in Iraq.” Throughout the book, he continually relates the battles within (and beyond) the Department to remain focused on the current operations rather than continuing with life-as-normal.

Gates worked out a deal with his Generals and Admirals. He would set strategy with other political appointees and Presidents Bush and Obama, and then do his best to let the military leaders figure out the tactics needed to succeed in the strategies. He constantly fought the White House and Congress to stay out of the weeds on tactics. While the soldiers, sailors, and airmen of the Defense Department were fighting and dying overseas, he fought the bureaucratic battles at home to ensure they were resourced and able to succeed.

Surprisingly, when President Obama won the Presidency in 2008, he asked Secretary Gates to stay on. Initially, the request was only for a year, but Gates details how Obama came to rely on his candor and advice, and kept pushing for him to stay longer. It was when Gates felt he had become too emotionally attached to the troops that he finally stepped down.

The value of this book is the insight it gives into how decisions are made at the highest levels of government. On issue after issue, from the Iraq and Afghanistan surges, to relations with Iran, to the crisis in Libya and the Arab Spring, Gates details how both the Bush and Obama administrations’ national security teams worked together (or didn’t work together) to reach a solution. At the same time, they were constantly dealing with Congress, our international allies, the media (with numerous leaks throughout almost every discussion), and most importantly, the American people. Gates was often the voice for realism, pushing for restraint while trying to keep the focus on Iraq and Afghanistan.

His vision of how Presidents make key decisions is eye-opening. For example, Gates states that during his 45 years in government, he could only recall three times when a “president risked reputation, public esteem, credibility, political ruin, and the judgment of history on a single decision he believed was the right thing for our country: Gerald Ford’s pardon of Nixon, George H. W. Bush’s assent to the 1992 budget deal, and George W. Bush’s decision to surge in Iraq” (though he does specifically mention later that President Obama risked his entire presidency on the Osama Bin Laden raid). Gates was not afraid to push back on both Presidents for what he believed, pushing President Bush to stop Israel from attacking a secret nuclear reactor in Syria in 2007 (President Bush decided not to try to talk Israel out of the attack and the Israel destroyed the facility) or pushing President Obama to not intervene in Libya in 2011. But when he disagreed, he did so privately in the White House and then explicitly supported the Presidents’ decisions in public.

Gates also details how government leaders work with foreign governments, such as President, and later Prime Minister, Putin in Russia. My favorite anecdote was when he met with the President of Kyrgyzstan in 2007 and was basically extorted for additional aid in order to continue the use of an airfield for supplying Afghanistan. Gates then went on to celebrate when the President was overthrown for running a corrupt regime in 2010.

So what did I learn from this book? A lot.

1. Senior leaders must find ways to work together. Gates did this again and again, calling upon other leaders and finding comprise, especially with Secretaries Rice and Clinton.
2. Senior government leaders must have a strategy and a plan for working with Congress. Gates kept Congress in the loop on key decisions, starred them down when needed, and worked with them to both cut the Defense budget and find a way to succeed (Gates goes much further than this in his book, calling Congress a variety of names and discussing how it was “always enjoyable to listen to three former Senators – Obama, Biden, and Clinton – trash-talking Congress”).
3. Leaders must remain focused on the ‘vital national interests’ of America. This is a term that came up a considerable amount in a national security class I took last semester. Gates continually refers to the term, and tries to stay focused and spend his time on those vital interests rather than the less-than-vital concerns.
4. Leaders must also remain focused on those they lead. There is a reason that Gates’ was known as the ‘soldier’s secretary.’ He fought to get soldiers the protection they needed in the form of the MRAP. He fought to get solders additional weapons and body armor when needed. He fought for those he was leading.
5. “Never miss a good chance to shut up.” Nothing more needs to be said.
6. Don’t judge people without knowing them. Secretary Gates initially had mixed feelings regarding Secretary Clinton, but when she joined the Obama team, he found her “smart, idealistic but pragmatic, tough-minded, indefatigable, funny, a very valuable colleague, and a superb representative of the United States.” He goes on to kick himself for judging someone just by what he knew from the media.
7. Civil-Military relations are important. Military leaders must be able to translate their experience and ideas into something senior civilians and politicians can grasp. In addition, they need to be careful with their words in the press. This was a significant issue that led to the resignations of two of Gates’ senior general officers (Admiral Fallon and General McChrystal). Senior civilian leaders must be clear about what they expect the military to accomplish for them. Both sides must find ways to work together and to understand each other.
8. Humility must be real. Don’t be afraid to admit your mistakes or weaknesses as a leader – just make sure you address them.
9. Finally – war is horrible and uncontrollable. America should only look to military engagement as a last resort – but we must be willing to use force when needed. Gates partially quotes Winston Churchill on the subject; I found the full quote on the internet and think it fits perfectly:

“Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on the strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter. The statesman who yields to war fever must realize that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events.”

I really enjoyed this book. At times, there was an element of ‘I went here, did this, met with this person, said this, and then went here, did this, met with another person’ and so on. But it was easy to get past that. Secretary Gates provides a window into how we made some of the most important decisions of the past decade, and how we did what needed to be done in Iraq and Afghanistan. Score: 8.5