I recently finished The Insurgents by Fred Kaplan. The title is actually a pun in itself; it covers the rise of Counter Insurgency (COIN) as a doctrine in the army over the past 25 years, and how the army had to adapt and accept COIN in order to achieve any success in Iraq and Afganistan. It follows the insurgents in the military who struggle to be heard against the prevailing wisdom of the time as they advocate for a COIN strategy.

COIN is relatively simple…instead of just fighting and killing insurgents, you also need to win the support of the population so they will turn against the insurgency you are fighting. However, it takes time, resources and troops; all of which must be focused on supporting the population, helping provide basic security, and setting up good governance (or allowing good governance to evolve into place). The book is clear that the time and resources (esp. in Afghanistan) were not always there.

Kaplan traces COIN thru the history of the military (it was around and used by the Marine Corps for a long time) and how is was shuffled aside following Vietnam. However, some officers remained rooted in COIN, esp. in the smaller wars (ie. not featuring major army on army clashes that were trained for). Officers such as LTCOL John Nagl (side note: I know Nagl personally and he was a mentor of mine) and GEN David Petraeus published on and advocated for COIN for years. Others officers used and implemented COIN strategies in the field (like LTGEN Barno in 2004-2005 in Afghanistan). Most of these times, these strategies were more effective than other practices in the field.

The biggest thing I learned from this book is that leaders must not be afraid of change and questioning their assumptions. In order to survive, succeed, and thrive today, an organization must continue to adapt and confront new realities. Eventually our forces did this and were able to find some degree of success. As leaders, we must continue look for when and were we must do this, and most importantly, not fear it.

So what was missing from this book: Why was there not a cohesive COIN effort until Petraeus took over in Iraq in 2007-2008? There was a lot of internal pushback against COIN. Many leaders did not support or believe in COIN. The book does not thoroughly explain why leaders such as Secretary Rumsfield and Gen Casey opposed COIN so strongly. Another missing element (in the effort and the book) was an explanation of where the rest of government was-COIN must both be a security effort and an effort by other parts of government (led by the Dept of State) to help the local population build the governance structures needed to take over from the COIN efforts. Yet too often the State Dept and the DOD seemed to be squabbling over personality differences and turf battles. Why did they not work together more effectively? Why was there not more pressure from above to force them to get on the same page?

Interesting reading about the history of COIN and a strong perspective on the wars of the past 15 years. However, it almost seems to glorify some COIN leaders a little too much: Kaplan rarely delves into the flaws of COIN or the leaders who support it. If so many people opposed COIN, it must have had more significant downsides than Kaplan lets on. Score: 7-an engaging history but points lost for a partial lack of objectivity and missing some key elements of COIN outside the military.